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LAW, NORMS, AND LEGAL CHANGE: GLOBAL
AND LOCAL IN CHINA AND JAPAN
Nicholas C. Howson*
Mark D. West**

The editors of the Michigan Journal of International Law have
boldly brought together four articles and commentary that focus on different aspects of the same problem in China and Japan: the relationship
between domestic legal change and foreign and/or "international" law
and regulation, "soft" agreements, norms, or even cultural practices. The
compilation is bold in part because scholarship on change in East Asian
law and legal systems often suffers from one of two defects. First, it often focuses on purely domestic phenomena in only one system, ignoring
the comparative connections. Second, scholars often attack the problem
from an exclusively comparative perspective, setting up two apparently
different systems, one "developed" and the other "backward" or "unsophisticated," with accompanying commentary on how they clash or how
the latter "conforms" or "measures up" to the former.
The authors in this issue instead raise questions about relationships
and processes that place rather earth-shaking developments in China and
Japan over the past 50 years within the wider global context. Those
questions are difficult; the authors strive to avoid easy portrayals of legal
imperialism or externally-imposed/internally-ignored norms while wading fearlessly into provocative debates about political, economic, and
cultural influence. The questions also are timely because of the sheer
scope and volume of legal system change in Japan and China over the
past 50 years and the now acknowledged importance of powerful Japan
and newly-resurgent China in the global economic, political, and legal
order (however defined).
This issue also represents a bold move because neither of us (Howson works on China, West on Japan) had any formal role in instigating or
editing the compilation. The work is entirely student-driven, and we
think the initiative and the finished product reflect nicely Michigan Law
School's century-long history with Chinese and Japanese law.
The editors have assembled here four articles that offer unique perspectives on law and norms in China and Japan. We offer no new
insights into their accounts in this introduction. Instead, we briefly describe the four articles and then raise a few conjectures about how they
might fit together.

*
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687

688

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 27:687

Randy Peerenboom's What Have We Learned about Law and Development? Describing, Predicting, and Assessing Legal Reforms in China
is another building block in his now voluminous oeuvre addressing the
implementation of "rule of law" (contrasted with "rule of man" or "rule
1
by law") in the People's Republic of China. A flurry of recent scholarly
literature, front-page journalism, and more than a few pundit commentaries have addressed the extent to which the "rule of law" exists or even
2
matters in transitional China. In other writings, Peerenboom has sought
to address, in great detail, what "rule of law" in the PRC context might
be, seeking most famously to distinguish between "thick" and "thin"
theories of rule of law, and evaluate China's 25-year-old program of "legal construction" accordingly. Peerenboom now advances his prior work
by questioning what actually constitutes legal "reform" (at least in the
Chinese context), speculating on how it comes about, and then providing
ideas about how to evaluate it-for Chinese consumers of the constructed system or international actors (whether states or individuals)
studying or seeking to spur developments inside the PRC.
Peerenboom concludes, among other things, that there neither is nor
should be a single approach to law and development and that the various
metaphors we use to describe reform-horizontal (foreign or domestic
source) or vertical (top-down)-may be misleading or flatly wrong. Instead, he argues strongly for an "inductive" (or bottom-up) inquiry into
the phenomenon of legal change in the Chinese circumstance and demands that policymakers and outside observers carefully evaluate on a
case-by-case basis which is better: the borrowing of legal reforms from
abroad or modification of existing local institutions. In the most compelling sections of his article, Peerenboom speculates on the way in which
locally-inspired mechanisms (such as the much-maligned adjudicative
committee or "individual case supervision" tools used in the Chinese
1.
See e.g., RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LoNG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW
(2002).
2.
See, e.g., Howard W. French, Chinese Turn to Civic Power as New Tool, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. I I, 2006, at Al; Joseph Kahn, At a Secret Meeting, Chinese Analysts Clashed
Over Reforms, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2006, at Al4; Joseph Kahn, A Sharp Debate Erupts in
China Over Ideologies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2006, at Al; Joseph Kahn, When Chinese Sue the
State, Cases Are Often Smothered, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2005, at Al; Joseph Kahn, Deep
Flaws, and Little Justice, in China's Court System, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2005, at Al; Phillip
P. Pan, In China, Turning the Law Into the People's Protector, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 2004, at
Al; Joseph Kahn, Chinese Advocates of Reform Seek Help From Deng's Spirit, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 21, 2004, at Al; Joseph Kahn, Let Freedom Ring? Not So Fast. China's Still China, N.Y.
TIMES, May 3, 2004, at A3; Phillip P. Pan, Chinese Leaders Speak of Reform, But How
Quickly?, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2004, at Al4; John Pomfret, Execution Reveals Party's Grip
in China; Case Highlights Flaws in Legal System, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 2003, at Al2; John
Pomfret, Defense Lawyers In China Find State ls Judge and Jury, WASH. PosT, Dec. 31, 2002,
at Al.
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court system) may actually contribute pragmatically to real "rule of law"
and thoroughgoing reform, notwithstanding virulent criticism heaped on
such mechanisms by Chinese academics and reformers and foreign observers alike.
Takao Tanase's Global Markets and the Evolution of Law in China
and Japan provides a useful bridge between Peerenboom's China "rule
of law"-focused article and the two Japan-focused pieces that complete
the issue. Tanase begins by examining the premise that the development
of law in both states historically has been undertaken by copying Western models (or, in the Chinese case, Western models via Japanese
importations). He then argues based on parallel developments in China
and Japan that imitation or direct importation, even in an increasingly
"globalized" world, is not the only possible path: law in both states
evolves as a product of both market competition and indigenous culture.
In this way, Tanase on Japan and China is in complete agreement with
Peerenboom on China, in that they both seek to privilege the inductive,
or "bottom-up," process of legal transformation in programs of reform.
At the same time, Tanase puts great weight on "extralegal" norms, practices, and expectations being determinative in the way a formal legal
system is rendered.
Like Tanase, Eric Feldman in The Culture of Legal Change: A Case
Study of Tobacco Control in Twenty-First Century Japan also looks at
how law has been imported into Japan, and he offers yet another explanatory peg: norms come first, followed by a desire to "conform" to
those norms, which brings about formal adoption by the state. Looking
at the legal control of tobacco and smoking in Japan, Feldman shows
how a series of laws enacted in 2000 came about largely as the result of
changing norms. The changes in those norms arose directly from an earlier-and rather violent-norm shift in the West. (Critically, the external
norm shift with respect to tobacco and smoking culture was absolutely
opposed and contradictory to the prevailing norm in Japan.) As in the
past, Japan imported those norms into its own system, they resonated
there, and they took shape as law. Feldman does a masterful job of tracing the story of this process, while offering important ideas about why
Japan desired conformity with the external norm and why it sought to
import the norm into the formal legal system. 3
Chuck Whitehead expands on the theme of external or international
(global) norms, and compliance with or defection from the same in the
Japanese case, in What's Your Sign? International Norms, Signals, and
3.
This piece dovetails nicely with Feldman's work on norms of private enforcement
in a closed system. See Eric A. Feldman, The Tuna Coun: Law and Norms in the World's
Premier Fish Market, 94 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006).
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Compliance. Whitehead examines international administrative law regulation of the banking industry and, necessarily, a different class of
4
players and issues than those Feldman analyzes. He looks specifically at
Japan's formal adoption and then incomplete or at least difficult implementation of the Basel Accord, which (among other things) set a
minimum percentage of capital to risk-weighted assets. The Accord is
non-binding, and Japan could have defected at any time, but instead it
chose to comply, at least in part, with the Accord's eight percent minimum, even in the face of economic difficulties and a sudden loss of asset
value (for banks and all other actors). In broad strokes, Whitehead's conclusion is similar to Feldman's: foreign or international norms, and a
desire to conform with the same or be seen to be conforming with the
same, directly influenced legal developments in Japan.
We find several themes in the articles particularly intriguing. First, the
two articles about Japan are primarily about norms and how they are translated, or not, into the domestie legal system---or at least the restraints on
domestic actors. The two articles about China are primarily about "rule of
law," substantive law, and formal legal institutions. This is a somewhat odd
turnabout, as it is Japan that is usually understood to have strong legal institutions: a strong civil law tradition, a strong judiciary, and an
independent bar. China is perceived to be far weaker in the legal institutional context. We think these contrasting focuses are an indication of the
different stages of China and Japan in their respective versions of legal
system development. While China is grappling with the most basic questions surrounding "rule of law" (substantive, institutional, and increasingly
political), Japanese developments since World War II demand an analysis
of phenomena that might be more sophisticated, mature, or engrained.
The focuses of these articles directly reflect what is happening on
the ground in China and Japan (and with the two states as actors in the
international system) as well. Japan appears to be becoming more legalistic: it is expanding the size of its bar, the number of lawsuits is rising,
court opinions are becoming increasingly important, and private parties
are using contracts to structure their relations more now than in the past.
Within this mix, people-not just scholars-are struggling to figure out
how the old norms fit and how the new law might reflect new norms. For
China, the dynamics are slightly different. There can be little doubt that
6
people in China (like in Wisconsin5 and Shasta County, Califomia ) con4.
For another take on Basel norms, see Michael S. Barr & Geoffrey P. Miller, Global
Administrative Law: The View from Basel, 17 EUR. J. lNT'L L. 15 (2006).
5.
See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary
Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 ( 1963).
6.
See ROBERT c. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).
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tinue to rely heavily on norms to structure various kinds of relationsfamilial, economic, transactional, and so on-while at the same time
diverting many interactions into the new legal system. Accordingly, Chinese people-and not just scholars, but Party members, government
officials, commercial actors, legal professionals, and citizens-are attempting to determine how the law-a new variable introduced only in
1979 but increasingly present with the "legal construction" program and
China's interaction with the world-fits into the preexisting scheme of
norms.
Second, and perhaps most importantly, the authors in this issue propose differing but related mechanisms for domestic legal change in
Japan and China and the relationship between that change and external
forces. These external forces range across a wide spectrum, from foreign
states intent on seeing domestic legal change in Japan and China inspired
by pure "reform" goals (i.e., improving administration and governance,
ensuring some notion of justice in the domestic system, and securing
compliance with public international law obligations), to the everglobalizing international trade economy and capital markets, to those
pushing a neoliberal "free markets under law" approach to economic
development, and so on. The external agendas are many, just as the responses inside China and Japan are varied. To (over)simplify,
Peerenboom reviews the interaction of foreign and domestic variables
but seems to reassert the primacy of indigenous factors. Tanase points to
the role of culture in determining which legal changes will "stick."
Feldman focuses his attention on imported norms, and Whitehead focuses on "network norms" among large players and the desire for
conformity, real or perceived. Who is right? We think a choice is unnecessary. All of these factors are important; the question for these and
future scholars is simply the degree to which these factors matter in varied situations-always taking account of history, economic development,
and cultural predispositions.
Third, we are struck at something the articles do not address: a concept which might tentatively be labeled "Asian law." As always, if we step
back far enough from the painting, we can see patterns begin to form-a
revelation of little surprise to those who know Japan's history of wide borrowing from China starting in the Tang Dynasty or China's more recent
borrowing, specifically in the legal sphere, from Japan (incorporating, in
tum, German civil law). Still, we find little that can be positively identified
as "Asian" in these pieces: what is definitively "Asian" about Peerenboom' s adjudicative committees, Feldman's tobacco use and regulation,
Whitehead's participation in capital adequacy norms, or Tanase's judicial
bureaucracy? In each case, the broad outlines of underlying "Asian" norms
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are identifiable, and authors like Tanase rightly focus our attention on
deeper issues like the Japanese judiciary's respect for what he calls society's "autonomous ordering." But in each situation described in these
articles lies a deeper lesson on which the authors agree: the relations of
law and norms in Japan and China are anything but simple. Feldman's
description of the importation into Japan of norms against smoking is necessarily more complex than explanations that rely on politics or economics
alone. Tanase finds that "informed by modem critical theory, we in mod7
em states view our law in a much more complicated manner." Whitehead
notes that "[d]ifferent actors may interpret compliance with, or defection
8
from, a global standard differently." And Peerenboom finds that at least in
China, descriptive metaphors meant to describe the establishment of the
9
rule of law "fail to capture the complexity of the situation."
For some readers, this acknowledgment of complexity might sound
like academic capitulation, a throwing up of hands when faced with the
inability to accurately analyze and concoct coherent theses. We should
keep in mind, however, that each of the authors is battling against some
relatively deep-seated-and simplistic-views about Japan and China
and their respective encounters with law. These wrong-headed ideas
might include well-known refrains such as "Confucian China will/will
not respect the rule of law" or "decisions about law in Japan are guided
by norms of harmony." What each of these pieces brings us, then, is not
just a more complex picture of law and norms in Japan and China but a
more accurate one, informed by empirics, specific case examples, and
appropriately tentative theory (or at least questions to ask that help divine theoretical constructs). Equally important, these articles try to tease
out the true, observable relationship between the developing Chinese
legal system and the far more established Japanese legal system, as well
as the external orders (public, private, financial, commercial, or humanitarian) that unavoidably have some direct impact on the two systems.
These efforts help elucidate both the past and the present, and they might
have predictive value as well.
Now that the editors of the Michigan Journal of International Law
have gathered this related scholarship in one place, what shall we do
with it? First, we hope that policymakers, academics, and legal professionals-and not just those focusing on China and Japan-will study
Takao Tanase, Global Markets and the Evolution of Law in China and Japan, 27
L. 873, 893 (2006).
8.
Charles K. Whitehead, What's Your Sign-International Norms, Signals, and Compliance, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 695, 741 (2006).
9.
Randall Peerenboom, What Have We Learned About law and Development? Describing, Predicting, and Assessing Legal Reforms in China, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 823, 862
(2006).
7.

MICH.

J.

INT'L
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these articles to learn not only of the complexity of the situation but of
the multitude of opportunities for continuing legal change.
Second, we urge scholars and commentators to view these pieces as
a jumping-off point for future research. We suggest two potential lines of
inquiry. First, the articles offer several new directions for study of China
and Japan. In the case of China, for instance, perhaps the articles in this
volume can push scholars to the next step of analyzing "rule of law" and
what it means--or should mean-for participants in Chinese society and
commerce alike. That analysis should include stories of the lives of ordinary people, such as citizens and commercial actors (or property rights
holders), as well as big-picture, theoretical inquiries. Such work will inevitably lead to more penetrating discussions of a whole system of
changes arising out of Chinese society itself, even if those changes
sometimes take on the cloak of a foreign-imposed or recommended
norm. In the case of Japan, the articles in this issue suggest the promise
of studying Japan not as a monolithic cultural entity but as a complex
system of norms shaped by a wide variety of forces. Perhaps more centrally, this issue shows the promise of comparative analysis between (and
among) Asian systems themselves, rather than between an "exporting"
West and a "receiving" East.
Second, although we are pleased to see the important focus on Japan
and China, how universal are these ideas and how can they be applied
even to what we assure ourselves are "developed" legal systems? Surely
we would not expect culture to fill the same role in every legal system
any more than we would expect underlying cultures to be similar in the
abstract. Do other cultures have, and to what extent, a "conformity
norm," as Feldman suggests in the case of Japan? How do differing interest group politics lead to different outcomes in other systems? Do
other societies institute pragmatic solutions to rule of law issues that initially seem to work against the purposes of "rule of law," as Peerenboom
suggests? In sum, will other societies create law and legal institutions in
the same way as Japan and China?

